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ABSTRACT

The paper uses a small analytical two-region (the United States and
the Rest of the Industrial World) model, to analyze three issues concerning
international economic interdependence and macroeconomic policy coordination
that have been raised in connection with the September 1985 World Economic
Outlook published by the IMF.

They are:

(1) What should be the monetary

and/or fiscal response in the Rest of the Industrial World to a tightening
of U.S. fiscal policy and what should be the U.S. monetary response?
(2) What should be the monetary and/or fiscal response in the United States
and in the Rest of the Industrial World to a "collapse of the U.S. dollar?"
The paper highlights the importance of determining the causes of such
a "liard landing" for the U.S. dollar, as the appropriate policy responses
are very sensitive to this; (3) What should be the macroeconomic policy
response in the Industrial

World to a disappointing real growth performance?

Again the correct identification of the reason(s) for the disappointment
is shown to be crucial.
The final section discusses and qualifies the activist policy
conclusions derived from the formal analysis.

Willem H. Buiter, "Macroeconomic. Policy Design in an Interdependent
World Economy:
An Analysis of Three Contingencies."

I.

Introduction*

The September 1985 issue of the IMF's World Economic Outlook (WEO)
clearly reflects this institution's concern with international economic
interdependence and macroeconomic policy coordination.

In this paper

I take up three policy issues that were the subject of widespread discussion,
both in the Fund and outside it during the period leading up to the publication
of the WEO.

They are:

(1) What should be the monetary and/or fiscal response in the rest
of the industrialized world to a unilateral tightening of U.S. fiscal
policy and what should be the U.S. monetary response?
(2) What should be the monetary and fiscal response in the industrialized
countries to a sudden, large change in an important exchange rate?

For

concreteness I shall refer to this event as a "collapse of the U.S. dollar";
and
(3) What should be the policy response in the industrialized world
to a disappointing real growth performance?
All three issues are clearly of more than academic interest.

In this

paper I attempt to give qualitative answers using a simple analytical
model.

However simple the individual country models may be, the inter

dependent global economic system very soon grows too large for analytical
treatment; numerical simulation methods are called for.

I propose to

investigate these same issues using a richer and more detailed three
country or three-region numerical simulation model in a sequel to this
paper.

Recent work by Sachs [1985] and by Sachs and McKibbin [1985]

has demonstrated the usefulness of such an approach.

The advantages

in terms of intuition and insight from keeping things sufficiently small

*This paper was written while I was a consultant in the Research Department of the IMF. The topic was suggested to me by Andrew D. Crockett. The
opinions expressed ip the paper are my own.
The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program in
International Studies. Any opinions expressed are those of the author
and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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and transparent to permit a simple algebraic and diagrammatic analysis
are such, however, that a first pass at this problem "in two dimensions"
is justified.
Section II.l outlines the simple two-country Dornbusch-style model
with a floating exchange rate, perfect capital mobility, rational exchange
rate expectations and gradual price adjustment.

The long-run or steady

state comparative statics are reviewed in Section II.2 while Section II.3
characterizes the nature of the dynamic adjustment process.

Possible

responses to a tightening of U.S. fiscal policy are reviewed in Section
III.

In Section IV possible responses to a collapse of the U.S. dollar

are considered and Section V deals with the policy implications of a
slowdown in world economic activity.

Qualifications and conclusions are

found in Section VI.
II.
II.l.

An Analytical Approach

The model
Consider the simple two-country or two-region version of the

Dornbusch (1976] open macroeconomic model with a freely floating exchange
rate and perfect capital mobility given in equations (1)-(12) below.
Except for some inconsequential differences, this model is the one used
by Miller (1982].

(See also Buiter [1985a] for another application.)

All variables other than interest rates are in natural logarithms.
All coefficients are non-negative.

Country 1 will be referred to as

the USA and country 2 as the Rest of the World (ROW).
(1)

m1 - Pl= k1Y1 - A1i1 + n1

(2)

Yl = -r1r1 + 0 1z(e + P2 - Pl)+ e12Y2 + f1

- 3 -

.

(3)

Pl = 'i'1(Y1 - 11) + m1

(4)

ri =- 11 - Pl

(5)

11 =- iz + e + •2 - ·1

(6)

mz

(7)

Y2 = -yzrz - 0 21(e + P2 - Pl) + e:21Y1 + f2

(8)

P2 = 1 2<Y2 - 12) + mz

(9)

r2 = iz - P2

(10)

C

(11)

11

-

m1

Pl

(12)

12

- mz

- P2

.

P2

:z

kzyz - ;\,ziz + nz

.

.

e + P2 - Pl

mj is the nominal money stock of country j, Pj its GDP deflater, Yj its
real output, ij its nominal interest rate and rj its real interest rate.
e is the nominal exchange rate, expressed as the number of units of
country l's currency per unit of country 2's currency.
of fiscal stance in country j,

fj is a measure

Tj is country j's tax rate on interest

income accruing from abroad and its subsidy rate on the interest cost of
borrowing from abroad.

These taxes drive a wedge between the domestic

nominal interest rate and the interest rate on loans denominated in the
same currency overseas.

c is the real exchange rate or competitiveness

and lj country j's stock of real money balances.
The model has rational exchange rate expectations and rational
inflation expectations by investors.

The exchange rate is set in an

efficient, forward-looking asset market.

It can make discrete "jumps
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at a point in time in response to "news".

Domestic costs (pj) are

predetermined (i.e. given at a point in time), but their rates of change
respond to excess demand or supply and "core inflation".
The model will have short-run "'Keynesian" but long-run classical or
monetarist features.

Each country's demand for real money balances varies

positively with its own national income Yj and negatively with its own
nominal interest rate ij•
substitution.
shifts.

A

y

There is no endogenous direct currency

shift parameter nj is added to allow for portfolio

The demand for each country's output depends on its real interest

rate rj, on competitiveness, c, on the other country's level of real
income and on the domestic fiscal impulse fj•
by an augmented Phillips curve.

Domestic costs are governed

The (logarithm of the) level of capacity

output Yj (or the natural rate of unemployment) in each country is
exogenous.

The augmentation term in the Phillips curve is taken to be

.

the current rate of growth of the money stock mj•

This is done merely

to permit a simple diagrammatic analysis of the model's properties.

More

satisfactory ways of modelling the augmentation term are discussed in Buiter

y We could specify the demand for real money balances as a demand for
money balances in terms of the country's consumption bundle. Let country
l's consumer price index pl be a weighted average of the domestic value
added deflater and the domestic currency value of the foreign value added
deflater, i.e. pl= a 1p 1 + (l-a1 )(e+p 2 ) 0(~1 (1. Money
demand is a function of real income y1+p 1-p 1 = y1 +(~-l)c and the
nominal interest rate, i.e.
m1-P1 = k1<Y1+p1-p1) - A1i1 or
11 = k1y1-A1i1 + (k1-l)(a 1 -l)c
This equals our equation (1) when k1=l. Nothing substantial is lost and
some notational simplicity is gained by sticking with equation (1).
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and Miller [1982, 1983a,bJ and will be incorporated in the larger macro
economic model that is solved using numerical methods in a sequel to this
paper.
The two countries are not only linked via competitiveness and
activity effects but also directly through an integrated international
financial market.

Equation (5) represents the condition for (after-tax)

uncovered interest parity.

US and ROW currency-denominated interest

bearing assets are perfect substitutes in private portfolios.

This will

be the case if the international financial markets are efficient and
there are risk-neutral speculators.
It will be convenient to represent the essential dynamics of this
mini-world economic world through three state variables, lj, j=l,2, real
money balances in each of the two countries and c, U.S.A. competitiveness.
The long run equilibrium

II.2.

The long-run comparative statics in this model are completely
classical or monetarist.

Output in each country is at its exogenously

given full employment level and changes in the levels and growth rates
of nominal money stocks are translated into corresponding changes in the
levels and proportional rates of change of costs and of the exchange
rate.

Equation

(13a-i) summarizes the long run equilibrium of this economy.
(13a)

Yi

Yi

i = 1, 2

(13b)

Pi = mi

i "" 1 ' 2

(13c)

e

(13d)

ri ""r2 + '2 - ' l

.

2

= m1 - m2
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(13e)

(13£)

(13g)

(13h)

(13i)

where

In the long run (at full employment) fiscal expansion in the U.S.
worsens U.S. competitiven ess while fiscal expansion in the ROW causes
U.S. competitiven ess to improve.

Neither changes in the levels nor in

the rates of growth of the nominal money stocks affect real competitiven ess
or real interest rates.

Fiscal expansion in the United States or in the

ROW raises the world real interest rate. (note that the U.S. and ROW real

- 7 -

interest rates differ only to the extent that U.S. and ROW taxes (subsidi es)
on foreign interest income (costs) differ.

An increase in

the U.S. real interest rate and raises that in the ROW.

'l - '2 lowers

Competi tiveness

therefor e must move against the U.S.A. to restore equilibr ium in the
market for U.S. ouput.

.

.

An increase s in m1 raises Pi and the rate of

deprecia tion of country i's currency by the same amount.

A higher nominal

interest rate reduces the stock of real money balances demanded in the
long run, if the interest -sensiti vity of the demand for real money balances
is non-zero .

Given the rate of money growth (and thus the rate of infla

tion), expansio nary fiscal policy in either country, by raising the real
interest rate, also raises the nominal interest rate and reduces the
demand for real money balances at home and abroad.
An increase in the level of capacity output (yi) of a country is
associat ed with an improvem ent in its long run competi tiveness .

This is

required in order for the market to absord the relative ly greater supply
of that country 's output~

Assuming that 012€21 - 012 and 021€12 - 012

are both negative , an increase in the level of capacity output in either
country lowers the long-run real interest rate in both countrie s; the
lower real interest rates stimulat e demand and bring it back to equality
with the larger level of full employm ent output.

Both directly , via the

income effect on money demand and indirect ly, by lowering the nominal
interest rate (since real interest decline and money growth is held
constan t), increase d capacity output in either country raises the long
run stock of real money balances in both countrie s.

-

II.3.

8 -

The dynamic response to policy changes and exogenous shocks
The three simultaneous state equations of the unrestricted model

are available from the author on request.

When the restriction is imposed

that the two countries or regions have identical structures, it becomes
possible to provide an analytical and diagrammatic exposition of the main
policy issues [see Aoki (1981] and Miller[l982]].

The assumption of

identical structures is of course quite restrictive.

All differences in

country performance must be attributed solely to different policies,
different exogenous shocks or different initial conditions.

A full

analysis of two or three country models which allows for inter-country
differences in the specification of major behavioral relationships will
require numerical simuiation methods.

The simplified two-country model

does, however, permit a very transparent first pass at the major policy
issues.

Symmetry in this model means that k1

~

k2 = k; X1 • Xz = X;

The three ~imultaneous state equations of the unrestricted model can
be decomposed into two independent subsystems when the restriction of
identical structures is imposed.

A two-dimensional system involves the

real exchange rate and the difference between the two countries' real
money stocks.

(14a)

l . ln

ridEt; r•11
•12
azl a22
=

c

+

[bll

b12 b13 b14

l

~d

h1s

b21 bzz bz3 bz4 bzs

nd
fd

,dj
-d
y
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where

all

= -WA-l y(n+e:)-l; a 12 = - 2Wo(n+e:)-l

1
a 21 .. -A- 1(1+e:)(n+e:)-l; a
22 ~ 2ra(n+e:)b11 = -~y(n+e:)-1; b12 = WA-1 y(n+e:)-1; b13 = -w(n+e:)-1
b14 = O; b15 = w(l+yw(n+e:)- 1 )
b21 = -(l+e:)(n+e:)-1; b22 = A-l(l+e:)(n+e:)-1;
h24 = 1; b25

= w<1-rr(1-rr(n+e:)-1 )

and

A one-dimensional system involves only averages or global magnitudes.

1 1H2
• =_
~1+iii2
f1+f2
n1+n2 ...a __•1+•2
na = _
. ma
_• fa . = _
_• na = --,...-•
__
Let A
.2'
2'
2'
2•·2

We have
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The "outµut equations,•• the equations giving the short-run endogenous
variables as functions of the state variables and the exogenous variables
are (using self-exµlanatory notation):

(15a)

di
d

[(O+e:)-ly,i.-1
~

~ d

l

-.i.-1(1-yij,+e:)(O+e:)-l

2(n+e:)-lo
z.i.- 1k(O+e:)- 1o

(O+e:)-1,i,y,i.-l

2ij,o(S'2+e:)-l

1.v.cd]
L
0

l

r;,_d1

-(n+e:)-lyljl

nd

o -.i.-lkyij,(O+e)-l

0

,d
-d
y

.

and

(15b)

y

a

ia
,a

p

r

a

,...,.,,,-,
-A

-1

(l-y<j,-e:)(1'2-e:)

(Q-e:) -1 <jly.l. -1

->.

-1

(1-e:) (0.-e:)

-1

r••1
j

-1

r,.~,-,,
+

(1'2-e:) -1 All+(l'l-e:)

-1

¾y

-(1-e: I rn-e:)

-1

m.a1

(1'2-e:)-l

a

-(1'2-e:)y<jl

-1
-1
A (l-y<j,-e:){1'2-e:)

(1'2-e:) -1,_ -lit

a

-A-lky<j,(l'l-e:)-1

~a

-1

"'

a

r

a

tj,(l-ry(l'l-e:)-1)

\-rd

-(ll-e:)

tj,y

l

-(1'2-e:)-ly>.-l

-1

tj,y.l.

-1

.l. -l(l-e:){O.-e:)-1

{1'2-e:)
(1'2-e:)

-1

[yd

The long-run comparative statics for the differences and averages
can be obtained easily from equations (13a)-(13i)

'l:/
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(16a)

L
20

fd

-d
_ L -rd + (l+e:)
26 y
20

(16b)

C

(16c)

rd = --rd

(16d)

_g_a = -Ama + na - -A fa + (k + :\(1-e:)) ya
y
y

= -

.

(16e)
Global or average economic performance and the difference between
the economic performances of the two countries are "decoupled":

they can

be studied independently of each other, with average outcomes a function
only of current and past average policy instrument values and average
exogenous shocks, while performance differences are a function only of
differences in current, past and expected future differences in policy
instrument values and exogenous disturbances.

The "averages" model

(equations (14b) and (lSb)) can indeed be viewed as a self-contained
model of a single closed economy.

Because the price deflators are pre

determined and the real exchange rate "washes out" through the assumption
of symmetrical structures, the "averages" model contains no nonpredeter
mined, forward-looking or jump variables.

In the richer structure of

the simulation model in the sequel to this paper, the average or global
economy does contain forward-looking variables, through forward-looking
investment decisions (Tobin's q) and wage setting.

Note that after

analyzing and averages and differences, we can easily retrieve individual
country performance, since 1 1 = 1/2 ld + la, 12 =-1/2 ld + la, etc.

- 12 -

The "averages" economy (equation 14b) with its single predetermined
state variable will be stable if and only if -fA- 1 (0 - e)-ly

<0

that is

i.f.f.
(17a)
The "differences" system (equation 14a) with its predetermined
variable 1d and its non-predetermined variable c, will have a unique
convergent saddlepoint equilibrium if and only if a11 a22 - a21 a12

<0

that is i.f.f.
(17b)
Since
Q

e >O, (17a) implies (17b)

>-e is equivalent to the condition that an improvement in U.S.

competitiveness will (given 1d, ;d, nd, fd and rd) raise the effective
demand for U.S. output relative to output in the rest of the world.

It

is a weak condition, which amounts to assuming that in a diagram with the
nominal interest rate on the vertical axis and output on the horizontal
axis, the IS curve (after using the Phillips curve to substitute out the
(expected) rate of inflation) is either downward-sloping or upward-sloping
and steeper than the LM curve.

I assume that 17(a) is satisfied.

Given

(17a) (and thereby (17b)), the saddlepoint equilibrium and the "differences"
system either looks like Figure la (when the IS curve is downward-sloping,
a2z

> 01/ and the ~=O locus is upward-sloping) or like Figure lb (when

the IS curve is upward-sloping and steeper than the LM curve, az2

<0

and

the c = 0 locus is downward-sloping and cuts the !d=o locus from above).
Since the phase diagram is qualitatively similar in the two cases, I shall
restrict the analysis to the case depicted in Figure l(a).

Figure l(c)

depicts the adjustment process of the single predetermined state variable
for the "averages

system.

Figure 1
.u

C

(a)

(b)

c=O

C•

S'

s

·d

•d

1 =O

1 •O

(c)

•a

1

0

Equilibrium and dynamic adjustment in the symmetric two-country model.
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First among the policy issues to be considered now is the proper
response in the ROW to a unilatera l U.S. fiscal contractio n.
III.
III.l.

Responses to a tightening of U.S. fiscal policy

U.S. fiscal tightening without fiscal or monetary response
in the ROW and without monetary response in the U.S.A

A fiscal tightening in the U.S.A. without any fiscal response in the
ROW is, in the notation of this paper, a reduction in the average fiscal
impulse (fa) and a reduction in the differenc e between the two countries '
fiscal impulses fd which is twice as large as the reduction in fa.

From

equations 16(a-e) it is clear that the long-run consequen ces of this
unilatera l fiscal contractio n will be the following:
(1)

an improveme nt in the U.S.A's competitiv eness (c increases );

(2)

a lowering of the real interest rate in the U.S.A. and in the
rest of the world;

(3)

an increase in the world real money stock because nominal
as well as real interest rates are lower in the U.S. and in the

R.o.w.
In Figure 2a we see that for c and 1d, the full long-run adjustmen t
from E1 to Ez occurs instantane ously.

Relative US-ROW real money balances

are unaffecte d by the U.S. fiscal tightenin g.

The required long-run

depreciat ion in the real exchange rate can therefore be brought about
immediate ly by a "jump" or step depreciat ion in the nominal exchange rate
of the United States.

- 14 -

In the new long-run equilibrium the global stock of real money
balances will be larger since lower nominal interest rates raise velocity.
Given nominal money growth rates in the U.S. and the ROW and without any
discrete changes in the levels of the nominal money stocks, the process
of increasing real balances requires that the rate of inflation be held
below the given ·rates of growth of the nominal money stocks.
therefore be a temporary global recession:

ya declines.

recession affects the U.S. and the R.O.W. equally:
the adjustment process.

There will

The global

yd is zero throughout

U.S. output declines because of the fiscal

tightening but the decline is mitigated somewhat as competitiveness
improves.

The ROW suffers from its loss of competitiveness, which mirrors

the improvement in the U.S. competitiveness.

The recession is therefore

concentrated in the non-traded goods sector of the U.S. and the traded
goods sector of the ROW.

Nominal and real interest rates and inflation

rates in the U.S. and the ROW are affected equally by the U.S. fiscal
contraction:

id, rd and pd are zero throughtout.

Both nominal and

real interest rates decline globally (and in each country).

As in the

familiar closed economy IS-LM, augmented Phillips curve model, the decline
in nominal and real interest rates mitigates the contraction of aggregate
demand but does not undo it completely.

There is "crowding out" (in our

policy experiment a reversal of crowding out) but less than 100 percent.
Note that because inflation declines during the recession, real interest

Figure 2a

C

(c=0)

S'

s

S'

Figure 2b
•a

1

E 2

0

1
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rates come down by less than nominal interest rates.

Figure 3 summarizes

the response to the unexpected announcement at time to of an immediately
implemented permanent tightening of U.S. fiscal policy.
III.2

Y

Monetary policy stabilizes the nominal exchange rate
One of the scenarios considered in the WEO consists of a tightening

of U.S. fiscal policy, unaccommodating U.S. monetary policy, unchanged
fiscal policy in the ROW and monetary policy in the ROW geared to interest
rate coupling.

Given perfect international capital mobility, interest rate

coupling amounts to having a fixed nominal exchange rate.

Under a fixed

exchange rate regime, a fiscal contraction in the U.S. will, with perfect
capital mobility, lead to a stock-shift outflow of capital from the U.S.,
a stock-shift loss U.S. foreign exchange reserves and a corresponding
contraction in the U.S. money stock.

The ROW experiences the counterpart

stock-shift inflow of capital, stock-shift gain in foreign exchange
reserves and expansion of its money stock.

It is therefore arbitrary

whether one assigns the stabilization of the exchange rate to the monetary
policy of the ROW or to the U.S.

Under a fixed exchange rate regime

(which is expected to be permanent) there is effectively a single global
world money market or world LM schedule.

Individual countries can choose

their own rates of domestic credit expansion and thus collectively
determine the growth of the world money stock.

The distribution of this

world money stock across countries -is determined by the individual countries'
1/ For ia to decline less on impact than in the long run, we must assume
that 1-y~-e > O. For ra to decline less on impact than in the long
run, we must assume thats< 1.
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money demand functions, with reserve flows making up the difference
between changes in domestic money demand and domestic credit expansion.
The formal analysis of the fixed exchange rate regime is very
simple.

Let the global stock of gold and foreign exchange reserves be

constant and, for notational simplicity, equal to zero.

The global money

stock is therefore the sum of the two countries' stocks of domestic
credit.

Let m be the· logarithm of the global nominal money stock, D1 the

logarithm of country i's stock of domestic credit and v the share of U.S.
domestic credit is total domestic credit.

Setting the logarithm of the fixed nominal exchange rate equal to zero,
we define the global price level, p, as follows:
(18b)

= Vpl

p

+ (1-v)pz

The global money demand shock n is similarly defined as:
(18c)

n

vn1 + (1-v)nz

a

and global income as
(18d)
µl

~

y

=n1

vyl + (1- v)yz

is the proportional rate of growth of country i's domestic

credit.

(Under a freely floating exchange rate regime, µi

= ~1-)

The

augmentation term in the Phillips curve is taken to be the policy-determined
µi rather than the endogenously determined m1•

No fixed exchange rate

regime is viable unless inflation rates converge.
µl

~

µ2

rates.

~

µ.

I therefore impose

This still permits short-term divergence of inflation

Also define i

= 11

= iz + '2 - 'l•

The model consists of
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equations (20)-(23) and (2), (4), (7) and (9).

Identical structures are

again assumed.
(20)

1 ,. ky - Ai+ n - (l-V)A(T1-Tz)

(21)

•
P1 = ip(yl-yl) +

(22)

P2 =- ljl(y2-y2) + µ

(23)

.

1

-

jJ

m - p

For algebraic simplicity and in order to retain comparability with
the floating exchange rate case, both countries are assumed to be of
equal size so v

m

1/2.

The fixed exchange rate version has two state variables, 1 and c
which are both predeter'l'lli.ned.

The equations of motion and the deter'l'lli

nation of output in the two countries are given in equations (24) and

(24)

ij,(K +K ) -1 y). -1
1 2
0

(25)

(Kl+K2)
-ij,-2-

-<j,(Kl-K2)

-1

-1

(Kl+K2)
-ij,-2-

1j,(Kl-K2)

-1
1j,

0

-1

-,i,y(Kl-K2)

-1

(l+,j,y(K +K )
1 2
2

1j, [l+,py(K -K )

1

2

-1 ]

-1

]
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(26a)

K1 =- 1 + y(..!. k>.-1-lj,)
2

(26b)

Kz ,,. lyk).-1
2

(26c)

/J,.

= K2

1

-

€

K2 "' (Kl +Kz) (K1-Kz)
2

Several points can be made about the fixed exchange rate system.
First, stability requires that K1+Kz

>0

equivalent to requiring that Ki> 0 and
either positive or negative.

and that Ki-Kz
/J,.

> O.

> O.

This is

However, Kz could be

With a fixed exchange rate, fiscal contrac

tion in the United States will therefore definitely lower U.S. real output
0

Yl
(from (25) ofi
• K1/J,.- 1 > O) but it may either raise or lower real output
3 Y2

in the ROW <afi = -K 2/J,.-

1

).

If Kz

< O,

the depressing effect on the

ROW's export sector of a deeline in U.S. deman4 outweighs the beneficial
effect of lower worldwide interest rates(.:> l yk>.- 1 in 26b) and the
2

ROW experiences a slump.

If the .. crowding in" effect is stronger than

the direct demand effect, (Kz > 0) then the ROW expands while the U.S.
contracts.

Even if output in both countries declines, the decline will

be steeper in the United States.
It is easily checked that, if the U.S. and ROW are of similar size,
total world output always contracts, even in the case where output in the
ROW is stimulated by lower interest rates:
(27)
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Note that average global real liquidity under the fixed exchange
rate regime (1/2 t given in equation (24)) behaves identically to average
global real liquidity under the freely floating exchange rate regime (la
given in equation 14(b)).

!/

The same holds for average world output.

(Compare equation (27) with ya from equation (15b)).

It is also checked

very easily that the long-run, steady state effects of fiscal policy (or
other real shocks) are the same under fixed and floating rates.
When therefore we compare the consequences of a tightening of U.S.
fiscal policy under a floating exchange rate with that under a fixed
exchange rate, holding global monetary policy constant in the sense that
the growth rates of domestic credit (and therefore the growth rate of the
· global stock of nominal money) are the same in the two regimes, the
recession in the U.S. following the fiscal contraction will be smaller
under a floating exchange rate while in the ROW the recession will be
deeper with a floating rate.
The global loss of output is the same under the two exchange rate
regimes, but while under a floating rate the recesions in the U.S. and
the ROW are identical in magnitude (although in the U.S. the non-traded
goods sector will be hit while in the ROW it will be the traded goods
sector), under a fixed rate the U.S. will always experience a deeper
recession.

It is even possible that under a fixed rate the ROW would

experience a net boost to output.

Y

Since K1 + K2 =

Q -

€.
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The short-run behavior of the real exchange rate is quite different
under the two regimes.

As

shown in Figure 3, under a floating exchange

rate U.S. competitiveness, which is a non-predetermined variable in this
case, sharply improves on impact to its new equilibrium level.

This

jump-depreciation of c reflects a jump-depreciation of e, the nominal
exchange rate.

While this clearly represents a hard landing for the U.S.

dollar, it represents a much softer lariding for the U.S. real economy
than the alternative scenario where the nominal exchange rate is kept
constant throughout.

In the latter case U.S. competitiveness improves

gradually after the U.S. fiscal contraction and converges asymptotically
to the same level achiev~d immediately with a freely floating exchange.
rate.

The improvement in competitiveness is due to the U.S. rate of cost

inflation falling below that in the ROW because of the relatively deeper
recession in the U.S.
III.3

Policies that achieve an i~provement in U.S.
competitiveness without a contraction of world demand
In this subsection I take as given the fiscal tightening in the

United States as well as the achievement of a last~ng improvement in U.S.
external competitiveness.

A floating exchange rate is again assumed.

A ROW fiscal expansion to match the U.S. fiscal contraction
In the formal setting of our little model, the transition to improved
U.S. competitiveness can be achieved instantaneously and without any
contraction of effective demand at home or abroad by having the U.S.
fiscal contraction matched by a corresponding ROW fiscal expansion.

In

Figure 3
Global and Regional Response to a Unilateral
Tightening o_f U.S. fiscal Policy
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terms of the dynamics of equations (14a,b) and (15a,b) and the steady
state conditions of equations (16a-e), this "package" consists of a
reduction in fd with fa unchanged.

Figure 4 shows the instantaneous

adjustment process.
There is no change in real or nominal interest rates as the effects
on the global capital market of the two opposing fiscal impulses cancel
each other out.

For a given U.S. fiscal contraction, the improvement in

U.S. competitiveness is now doubled (in our linear model) because of the
fiscal expansion in the ROW.

World aggregate demand is unchanged and so

is aggregate demand for each individual country's output.
There are several qualifications to be made before this painless
adjustment package is recommended for use in the real world.

First,

while. total output stays constant in each country, there is a shift
towards the production of tradeables in the U.S. and towards the production
of nontradeables in the ROW.
conversely.

Steelworkers make poor hairdressers and

The problems associated with changing the sectoral composition

of production, employment and investment are ignored in our simple model.
Second, the selection of dosage and timing for the ROW fiscal
expansion is made to look simpler than it is in practice because of the
assumption of known, identical structures.

While this in no way weakens

the case for a flexible policy response in principle, it makes the
practical task of selecting the right mix, dose and timing a much more
complicated matter than our simple model may suggest.

Figure 4

C

l

a

Response to a U.S. fiscal contraction and a matching ROW fiscal expansion.
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Third, a fiscal expansion in the ROW may be opposed for structural or
allocative reasons.

Increased public spending may be undesirable because

of its political irreversibility and because, at full employment, the
benefits from the spending are judged to be less than its cost.

Lower

taxes or higher transfer payments may be undesirable because of possible
efficiency losses, undesirable incentive effects or for distributional
reasons.
Fourth, fiscal expansions (other than balanced-budget fiscal expan
sions) entail larger deficits and, in time, a larger public debt.

If the

real interest rate exceeds the growth rate of the real tax base, explosive
debt-deficit spirals are possible unless the primary (non-interest) deficit
is planned (and believed) to become a surplus in due course.

If there is

no reputation for fiscal rectitude, temporary (increases in) deficits
will be extrapolated into the future.

Fear of possible future monetization

of deficits will raise long nominal interest rates.

Increased uncertainty

about the future course of inflation may add a further risk premium to
the required rate of return on nominal government debt.

In extreme

circumstances, fear of partial or complete debt repudiation or of special
capital levies and surcharges may build a risk premium into the rate of
return on all public debt (See Blanchard, Buiter and Dornbusch (1984] and
Buiter [198Sb]).

A good reputation for underlying fiscal rectitude would,

however, avoid the potential crowding out resulting from such confidence
effects.

It might therefore help if such a program were supervised by or

at least coordinated through an organization such as the IMF whose
reputation for fiscal restraint is second to none.
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Finally, it may be judged that the global level of effective demand
is currently excessive, and that a net reduction in global demand is in
order, as well as a realignment of U.S. competitiveness.

A unilateral

U.S. fiscal contraction might in that case be the right policy.

The

point would seem to be mainly of academic interest, as in the opinion
of most observers there remains a margin of Keynesian slack in the world
economy.
A U.S. fiscal contraction matched by effective demand

maintaining expansionary monetary policy changes
Calls for a change in the U.S. macroeconomic policy mix, from tight
money and loose fiscal policy to looser money and tighter fiscal policy
have been heard from all corners of the profession in recent years.
There are two kinds of monetary policy changes that could be used in the
present model:

changes i n ~ of the nominal money stock and changes

in the proportional growth rate of the nominal money stock.
Money "jumps"
It is clear from inspection of the steady state conditions (16a, e)
and the equations of motion (14a, b) and (15a, b) that there is one and
only set of discrete (discontinuous) changes in the levels of the nominal
money stocks in both countries that will permit an instantaneous transition
at full employment (in both countries) to the new real long run equilibrium
associated with the unilateral reduction in the U.S. fiscal impulse dis
cussed in Section III.1.

If df1

<0

is the size of the U.S.

fiscal

contraction, these nominal money jumps in both countries are given by
(28)

:\

dm1 = dm2 = - -2y df1
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At the predetermined price level, this nominal money jump provides
just the right increase in real money balances demanded as a result of
the lower nominal (and real) world interest rate associated with the
lower global fiscal impulse.

There is no need to force the price level

path below the nominal money stock path through a policy of demand
deflation and unemployment.

The steady state increase in real money

balances which in a new-classical model with a non-predetermined, flex
ible price level would be brought about by a discrete downward jump in
the price level path, is achieved in the Keynesian, predetermined price
level model by a stock-shift open market purchase in each country which
increases the nominal money stocks by the required amounts.

It is the

stickiness of real money balances which makes a recession inevitable when
there is any exogenous shock or policy change which raises the long-run
demand for money balances.

This stickiness of the real money stock

reflects both the stickiness of domestic costs (assumed to be a policy
and exogenous shock-invariant structural property of private market
behavior), and the stickiness of monetary policy.

If the level of the

nominal money stock is a choice variable at any given instant, policy
flexibility can make up for and compensate for domestic cost inflexibility.
The great advantage of the kind of once-and-for-all nominal money
stock jumps considered here is that they don't result in any change in
the rate of inflat~on, short run or long run.

They do cause the long-run

level of the path of prices to be higher than it would otherwise have
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been, but since welfare costs are associated with the rate of inflation
rather than with the level of prices,

l/

this is no cause for concern.

The major problem with money jump policies is their effect on inflationary
expectations.

The obvious analytical distinction between a discontinuous

discrete change in the level of the money stock path and a (finite)
change in the instantaneous rate of change of that path may not be as
, obvious in practice, especially when the money stock path is sampled at
discrete time intervals:

a once-and-for-all upward level change at a

point in time in the middle of an observation interval to may look much
like an increase in the rate of growth between to and to+ 1.

If such

an apparent increase in the growth rate gets extrapolated into the
future, serious instability may result.

Governments or central banks

with a reputation for monetary rectitude will be able to engineer once
off money jumps without adverse effects on inflationary expectations.
Governments or central banks with a reputation for monetary laxness will
be prisoners of the markets' lack of confidence and may have to live with
the adverse effects on inflation expectations of any observed increase
in the money stock.
Note that if the monetary authorities had nominal income targets
rather than monetary targets, there should be no credibility problems
associated with a once-off increase in the nominal money stock.

ll

Nominal

The statement is meant to apply to a world without uncertainty only.
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income targets are velocity-corrected monetary targets.

They have

desirable operating characteristics whenever exogenous shocks or policy
changes necessitate a change in velocity.
Changes in money growth rates
The other monetary policy action (in both countries) that can achieve
the transition to an improved level of U.S. competitiveness without any
output or employment cost is an equal permanent increase in the rate of
growth of t~e nominal money stock in each country.

It can again be

checked from the steady-state conditions (16a) - (16e) and from the
equations of motion (14a, b) and (15a, b) that the following permanent

.

.

increase in m1 and m2 will achieve an instantaneous transition at full
employment (in both countries) to the new real long-run equilibrium
associated with the unilateral reduction in the U.S. fiscal impulse
discussed in Section III.I.

This monetary policy response would, by raising the rate of inflation in
both countries, prevent the global real interest rate decline resulting
from the U.S. fiscal contraction from being translated into a decline in
nominal interest rates.

With nominal interest rates unchanged, there is

no increase in the demand for real money balances and consequently no
need for a recession to depress the general price level path below the
nominal money stock path.

The policy has one obvious undesirable feature:

a recession is prevented at the cost of having a permanently higher rate
of inflation in the world economy.
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IV.

Responses to a Collapse of the U.S. Dollar

A second question addressed by econanic p::ilicy makers and analysts is the
proper response (in the U.S. and.in the ROW) to a sudden large fall in
the value of a key currency, taken to be the U.S. dollar for concreteness in this paper.

To determine the nature of the appropria te policy

responses , we first must determine what the causes of the sudden depre
ciation of the currency are.

There are two broad classes of possible

causes: (a) the bursting of a speculativ e bubble that had caused the
dollar to be overvalued in relation to the "fundamen tals.••

(b) an actual

or perceived change in the fundament als driving the exchange rate.
latter category can be subdivided into a number of cases.

The

(1) a port

folio shift against the dollar reflecting , say, greater uncertain ty about
the future prospects for U.S. inflation .

In the simple model of this

paper, this can be represente d by a reduction in U.S. liquidity preferenc e:
a fall in n1; (2) an increase in the real risk premium on foreign-ow ned
U.S. assets.

This could reflect fear of future increases in taxation

of U.S. interest income and, conceivab ly, a greater perceived risk of
repudiatio n or default.

In the model this can be represente d by an

increase in ,z-•1: the real risk premium is like a net tax on U.S. interest
income; (3) an unexpected increase in the level of the U.S. money stock
or in the rate of U.S. monetary growth; (4) an unexpecte d tightening of
the U.S. fiscal stance.
All four events should be thought of in relative terms, e.g., the
portfolio shift against the dollar reflects an increase in uncertain ty
about U.S. inflation relative to uncertain ty about inflation in the rest
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of the world.

Similarly, it is looser U.S. monetary policy relative to

monetary policy elsewhere or tighter U.S. fiscal policy relative to
fiscal policy elsewhere that puts downward pressure on the dollar.
An important issue in determining the appropriate policy response

to a sudden drop of the dollar in response to a change in.private sector
perceptions concerning the likely future course of the fundamentals, is
whether the national, authorities and the international coordinating agency
share these new perceptions.

A different approach will in general be

called for if the authorities believe they have information superior to
that used by private.agents in forming expectations, but there is no way
of sharing this information with private market participants or of con
vincing them of its relevance.

In what follows, no superior public sector

information is assumed.
1.

A bursting bubble
It is well-known that the solution of rational expectations models

with forward-looking , non-predetermin ed state variables (such as the
nominal and the real exchange rate in our model) may be characterized by
a bubble; that is, the behavior of the endogenous variables may be
influenced by variables that matter only because, somehow, private agents
believe that they matter.

These bubble processes, which affect expec

tations in a self-validating manner, may be functions of the fundamental
variables (i.e. those variables that enter into the structure of the
model other than merely by being part of the information set used to form
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expectations) or of completely extraneous or spurious variables of the
"sunspot" variety (Blanchard (79); Azariadis (1981], Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1983]).

In Figure 5, it is assumed that all "fundamentals" have con

stant values, now and in the future, that the steady state equilibrium corresponding to these constant values for the fundamentals is E0
and that the associated convergent saddle path is S0 S0 •

Suppose, without

loss of generality, that the predetermined variable is at its steady-state
value t~.

The non-predetermine d variable, c, however, is on a bubble

path EE which overvalues it relative to the path warranted by the fun
damentals (S 0 S0

).

Its value at t 0 , the time the bubble bursts is c 0 •

The bursting of the bubble moves c instantaneously to its fundamental
value c*.

In a rational world, there must be uncertainty about the

direction of the discrete jump in the exchange rate at t 0 •

The instan

taneous discrete upward jump inc and e would, if it were anticipated
with certainty, promise an infinite rate of return to shorting the dollar
the instant before t 0 •

There could however be a set of beliefs which at

t 0 , attaches some probability Il 0 to a return to the fundamental value
(~c

~

c*-c 0 ) and some probability 1 - IT 0 to a further discrete

downward jump inc to c1 which puts the exchange rate on a bubble path
even further removed from its fundamental value.
(1 - IT 0 )(c1 - c 0

)

= 0 there are no expected excess returns from taking an

open currency position.

l/

Provided Il 0 (c* - c 0 ) +

1:,/

It seems quite self-evident that the right

The behavior of id and C given in equation (14a) can be summarized

[.:J •{]

+ Bz

(To be continued on page 30.)

Figure 5
The End of an Exchange Rate Bubble

C

s0

1

- 30 -

thing to do for policymakers when a bubble bursts is to sit back and
enjoy the sight.

While we don't have a well-developed theory of the

welfare economics of speculative bubbles in a world with uncertainty,
limited and asymmetrically distributed (insider/outsider) information,
there is a strong presumption that they are costly and harmful as well as
unsustainable.

l/

It may be that the fundamental valuation to which the

(Continued from page 29)

r.
1
where A= taijJ,
variables.

B

~

{

bij }

and z is the vector of exogenous

The General solution for c and .i can be shown to be (Buiter [1984a])
°" :X.z( t--r) c(t) = -Wzz- 1Wz11d(t)-Wzz- 1 le
DEtz(T)dT + Wzz-l F(t)
t

t A1(t-s)
~
Az(s--r)
- f e
a 12w22 -l f e
DE 8 z(T)d-rds
t0
s
A 1 ( t-s)

t

+

f

e

to

a 12 w22 - 1F(s)ds

Al is the stable eigenvalue of A and Az the unstable eigenvalue.

wu
[Wz1

wizl

= W=

v-l

where Vis the matrix whose columns are the right

Wzz

eigenvectors of A.
Fis the bubble component.
arbitrary.

It satisfies EtF(t) = AzF(t) but is otherwise
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exchange rate returns when the bubble bursts, itself represents an
unattractive equilibrium because the fundamentals (especially current and
anticipated future policy) are in a mess.

That, however, is an argument

for doing something about the fundamentals, when the exchange rate once
again reflects those fundamentals, which would have been desirable even
if there had been no bubble and no sudden drop in the exchange value of
the dollar.
In reality, the ending of a speculative bubble is likely to be
associated both with major redistributions of wealth and with short-term
disruption of financial markets, commerce and production because of bank
ruptcies and insolvencies.
in our formal model.

None of these adjustment costs are included

I would be surprised, nevertheless, if it could be

shown that it is better to end a bubble with a s!ow puncture than with a
quick burst.

A hard landing of the dollar under these circumstances does

not preclude a soft landing for the world economy.

No policy response in

the U.S. or in the ROW seems necessary.
2.

A reduction in U.S. liquidity preference
A downward shift in the U.S. liquidity preference schedule (a fall

in n1) has no long run effects on competitiveness or on real or nominal
interest rates.

In the short run, the effects are as depicted in Figure 6.

An unexpected, immediate, permanent reduction in n1 works just like a
once-off increase in the level of the U.S. money stock.
real exchange rate jump-depreciates to Eo1 from E0 •

The nominal and

After that the real

exchange rate gradually moves back to its initial level and the system
converges to E1•

In the U.S. real economic activity booms because of
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short-run lower nominal and real interest rates and because of the
improvement in competitiveness.

Average world economic activity also

rises (ya increases) because of the short-run downward pressure on
nominal and real interest rates.

Activity levels in the ROW are,

however, depressed, as the loss of competitiveness outweighs the effect
of lower interest rates.

If the initial equilibrium was deemed satis

factory, the obvious policy response to the fall in liquidity preference
is a matching once-off reduction in the level of the U.S. nominal money
stock.

This woud leave all real and nominal variables (other than ti)

unchanged.
If the shift out of U.S. money represents stock-shift currency
substitution and has as its counterpart a matching stock-shift increase
in foreign money demand nz, the change in competitiveness will be twice,
as large.

Average real world activity (ya, ia,

in the short run and in the long run.

p~

and ra) are unchanged

The behavior of c and td is like

that illustrated in the top diagram of Figure 6, but with a shift up and
to the left of the saddlepath that is twice as large.

The U.S. experiences

a transitional boom that is matched by a transitional slump in the ROW.
The obvious way to neutralize this once-off currency substitution and
stabilize the exchange rate is to contract the U.S. money stock by -An1
and expand the ROW money stock by Anz.

Such monetary policy changes in

addition may well have favorable effects (not formally modelled here) on
the relative changes in inflation uncertainty that may have prompted the
money demand shifts in the first place.

Figure 6
Dollar Deprec±at±o-1 1 as a ilesu.lt of a Fall in
U.S. Liquidity Preference
C
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An increase in the real U.S. risk premium
An increase in the relative perceived real riskiness of foreign
investment in the U.S. will in the long run raise the U.S. real and
nominal interest rates and lo.wer the ROW real and nominal interest
rates, leaving the average world rates unchanged.

The increase in U.S.

riskiness and reduction in ROW riskiness are assumed to apply only to
foreign investors, not to domestic capital formation in either country.
Figure 7 illustrates the dynamic response pattern to this shock.
averages (ta, y8 , ia, pa and ra) are not affected.

Global

The U.S. economy

experiences an immediate jump-depreciation of the nominal and real
exchange rate from E0 to Eal•
Note that the real exchange rate overshoots its long run equilibrium
value.

After the initial jump there is a gradual depreciation of the

U.S. real exchange rate.

The new long-run equilibrium at E1 represents

a net real depreciation relative to the initial one.

The U.S. economy

experiences a transitory boom which lowers its real stock of money bal
ances.

The ROW goes through a transitory slump which raises its real

money balances.
One possible policy response that exactly neutralizes this increase
in the U.S. foreign investment risk premium is an equal increase in

•1- '2•

the excess of the U.S. tax rate on interest income accruing from abroad
over the ROW's tax rate on interest income accruing from the United States.
This would restore the initial equilibrium immediately.

Alternatively, a

C

Figure 7
An Increase in the Relative Perceived Riskiness of

Foreign Investment in the U.S.
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once-off increase in the ROW's nominal money stock by A times the change
in the risk premium and a reduction in the U.S. nominal money stock by
the same magnitude, would instantaneously achieve the same long-run change
in the real equilibrium shown in Figure 7, without any transitional U.S.
inflation and ROW contraction.

A permanent increase in the U.S.'s rate

of monetary growth and an equal reduction in the ROW's rate of monetary
growth with d~l - d~2

=d~d

= -d(risk premium) would, in Figure 7, move

the economy immediately from Ea to Eo1, which would now be the new long-run
equilibrium.
Policy-induced exchange rate collapses
The response of the exchange rate to changes in fiscal and monetary
policy in the United States and ROW has already been discussed in Section III.

The only point wo1;th repeating here is that a "hard landing"

for the U.S. dollar need not represent a hard landing for the U.S. economy
or for the ROW.

If the initial situation is one characterized by current

and anticipated future lax U.S. fiscal policy and tight U.S. monetary
policy, these fundamentals are likely to be reflected in a strong (an
"overvalued") U.S. real exchange rate.

The first-best cooperative, coordi

nated global policy package to change this unfavorable equilibrium (fiscal
contraction in the U.S., once-off monety stock increases in the U.S. and
the ROW to meet the resulting fall in velocity) is accompanied by a dollar
"collapse."

It may seem paradoxical that the restoration of confidence

in the ability of the U.S. to get and keep its budget under control,
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would be accompanied by a fall in the U.S. dollar, but such a view
reflects the mistaken identification of the exchange rate as an
index of national economic ma·cho.
V.

Policy Responses to a Slowdown in Global Economic Activity

The first question that needs to be answered before one can deter
mine the appropriate U.S. and ROW policy responses to a global economic
slowdown concerns the cause(s) of this slowdown.

A distinction must be

made between a slowdown resulting from an adverse supply-side shock
(modeled in our simple model by a temporary or permanent fall in Yl or
Y2) and a demand-induced slowdown.

Am.ont the latter we can again dis

tinguish adverse money demand shocks (increases in n1 and n2) and reduc
tions in private U.S. or ROW demand for goods and services (which can be
represented as reductions in f1 or f2)•
Adverse supply-side developments
Permanent reductions in productive capacity in the U.S. and the ROW
raise the long-run real interest rate everywhere and thus bring demand
down in line with supply.

Nominal interest rates will also rise if money

growth rates are unaffected and, both through real income and interest
rate effects, the demand for real money balances in both regions will
decline in the long run.
both countries

(~y1

If productive capacity is affected equally in

= ~y 2 ~

~y)

there is no long-run change in ld or on c.

In this case, as shown in Figure 8, the world economy undergoes a bout of
excess demand and inflation in excess of the rate of monetary growth

Fig ure 8
Eff ects of a Common Per man ent Dec
line in Pro duc tive Cap acit y
in Bot h Cou ntri es
C

·a

g_
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(affecting both regions equally) which in the long run lowers the long
run stock of money balances.

In the very short run, output (which is

demand-determin ed) actually rises because higher inflation reduces the
real interest rate (nominal interest rates rise less than one-for-one
with the rate of inflation because the LM curve is not vertical).
The policy response that prevents the emergence of excess demand and
inflationary pressures during the transition to the lower levels of
capacity output, involves a contraction of demand which can be achieved
either by fiscal or monetary means (or by a combination of the two).

If

no long-run change in competitiveness is desired, any fiscal contraction
should be equal in the two countries.

Probably the simplest coordinated

policy action that achieves the new long-run equilibrium at E1 in Figure 8
·
immediately, is a reduction in m1 and in mz equal to

(

k +

A(l-e)) -

y

Ay.

If the common capacity decline at to is expected to be temporary and
to be reversed at t 1 , there is still no action in c-ld space (the top
diagram in Figure 8).

The world economy experiences a bout of excess

demand between to and t1 (moving from Eo1 to Eoz) and a bout of excess
supply after t1 (between Eo3 and Eo)•

The same reduction in m1 and in mz

at to will take the world economy (without excess demand) from Eo to E1
where it will stay until t1•

At t1 both nominal money stocks should be

increased again by the same percentage by which they were reduced at to
in order to achieve a painless and instantaneous restoration of full
equilibrium at E1•
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An adverse permanent supply shock in the United States alone, say,
would cause a long-run worsening of the U.S. competitiveness (required to
choke off global demand for U.S. output), some increase in global real
and nominal interest, rates (but less than with a common decline in capacity
output), a decline in U.S. real money balances and a smaller decline in
ROW real money balances.
ation of the dollar.

On impact, there is likely to be a step appreci

After that the real exchange rate continues to appre

ciate gradually towards its new long-run equilibrium.

Real interest

rates in the United States will be below those in the ROW during the
transition.

A reduction in the U.S. nominal money stock by an amount

and an increase in the ROW nominal money stock by

will permit an instantaneous transition to the new real long-run equili
brium with lower values of c, 1d, and 1a, avoiding the transitory infla
tion in the United States and the transitory contraction in the ROW that
would otherwise occur.
A demand-induced slowdown in economic activity
When the cause of a disappointing level of economic activity is a
decline in some component of private demand, appropriately designed
demand management can minimize the damage and, in the present model, can
be used to avoid it altogether.

Increases in private liquidity preference
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(n1 and nz) can be met with corresponding once-off increases in the
levels of the nominal money stocks-mi and mz.

A downward shift in the

private consumption functions or a collapse of animal spirits can be
offset directly by corresponding fiscal stimuli f1 and fz.

If the balanced

budget multiplier theorem retains some validity, these fiscal stimuli can
be provided without increasing the deficit.

Supply-side consequences

from the tax increase or transfer payments cuts involved in a balanced
budget expansion should of course be taken into account (the behavioral
links, ignored in this paper, between f1 and Yi>•
Note that it is never necessary, in response to any shock, to engineer
a permanent change in monetary growth rates.

Once-off changes in the

levels of the nominal money stocks (or temporary changes in money growth
rates) are sufficient.
VI.

Conclusion

This paper presents a rather old-fashioned study of demand management
in an open, interdependent economic system.

Three contingencies discussed

in the September 1985 World Economic Outlook were analyzed using an
eclectic, short-run Keynesian, long-run classical, two-country model.
The main conclusion is that an active monetary and/or fiscal response in
both countries or regions is in general required to minimize the costs
associated with the adjustment process resulting from a variety of demand-side
or supply-side shocks.

One exception to this rule is the case of a currency

collapse resulting from the bursting of an exchange market speculative bubble.

A unilatera l U.S. fiscal contraditi on will cause a temporary slowdown of
world economic activity as well as a sudden drop in the nominal and
real value of the dollar.

Merely preventing the nominal exchange

rate from changing does not reduce the magnitude of the global recession
or alter the long-run real adjustmen t that takes place, but it would
redistribu te the unchanged global unemployment and excess capacity
burden towards the United States and away from the ROW.

A no-respon se

policy would be consisten t with the achieveme nt of improved U.S.
competitiv eness at full employment if the initial situation were
character ized not only by a U.S. fiscal-mo netary policy mix that
is

biased towards fiscal expansion and monetary tightness , resulting

in a poor U.S. internatio nal competitiv e position, but also by global
excess demand.

An expansion ary fiscal move in the ROW or a combined

expansion ary monetary policy move in both the United States and the
ROW or a combined expansion ary monetary policy move in both the United
States and the ROW could achieve the desired traverse to a better
level of U.S. competitv eness without a global slump.

These monetary

stimuli need not be permanent increases in the rate of money growth.
Once-off credible open market purchases raising the levels of the
nominal money stocks suffice.
The stabilizin g policy response to a sudden drop in the value of the
dollar depends crucially on the reason(s) for this drop.

The bursting of a

speculativ e bubble has no obvious monetary or fiscal policy implicatio n.
Downward pressure on the value of the dollar resulting from a once-off
fall in U.S. liquidity preferenc e calls for a matchiAg once-off reduction
in the U.S. nominal money stock.

Direct currency substituti on away from
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the dollar calls for open market sales in the United States and open
market purchase s in the ROW.

The conseque nces of the emergence of a real

risk premium on the return from foreign investme nt in the United States
can be neutrali zed by a matching increase in the differen ce between the
U.S. tax rate on interest income from the ROW and the ROW's tax rate on
interest income from the United States.

Alterna tively, one might accept

the deprecia tion of the nominal and real U.S. exchange rates but avoid
the transiti onal U.S. inflatio n and ROW contract ion by expandin g the
money stock in the ROW and reducing it in the United States.

The stabiliz ing policy response to a slowdown in global economic
activity depends on whether this slowdown reflects a deterior ation of the
supply side or deficien t aggreagt e demand.

To avoid the stagflat ion that

would otherwis e result from a global adverse supply shock, demand- reducing
measures are called for in both countrie s.

If the supply shock is

temporar y, the restrict ive measures can be reversed when capacity output
recovers , thus maintain ing capacity output.

The stabiliz ing response to a fall

in private demand for goods and services is a fiscal stimulus .

The contrac

tionary effects of an increase in liquidit y preferen ce can be avoided by
an accommodating (non-inf lationar y) increase in the level of the money stock.
The fiscal stimuli discusse d in this paper are to be interpre ted as
"discret ionary" changes over and above the automat ic changes in tax
receipts and transfer payments that reflect the workings of existing tax
and benefit laws, rules, and regulati ons ~s the level of economic activity
varies, and that may dampen but never eliminat e such fluctuat ions.
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To provide truly satisfactory answers to the questions raised in the
WEO the model of this paper would have to be extended in a number of
directions.

The WEO approaches the macroeconom ic issues of the indus

trialized world in a three-region setting:
and Japan plus Canada.

the United States; Europe;

The complexity entailed in going to three regions

virtually obliges one to use numerical rather than analytical methods.
The model of this paper ignores all stock-flow asset dynamics, those
coming from the government budget identities, those coming from the
current account of the balance of payments, and those resulting from real
capital accumulation .
numerical methods.

ll

Again, their incorporatio n requires the use of

Finally, it would be extremely desirable to allow

explicitly for uncertainty.

Adding some linear stochastic processes with

known coefficients to the deterministi c model is feasible but does not
constitute much of an advance.

Anything more complicated , even linear

models with stochastic coefficients , let alone non-linear stochastic
models, means that we enter the mathematica l or computation al stratosphere .
The modelling language we would like to use just does not exist yet.
The logic of the model used in this paper, and indeed of any model
that permits persistent disequilibriu m or non-Walrasia n equilibrium is
that monetary and fiscal policy instruments can be used actively to
stabilize output, employment, and the price level in response to a whole
1/ For a numerical simulation model which incorporates all three
sources of asset dynamics in a two-country, full employment setting, see
Buiter (1984b).
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range of demand or supply shocks.

To argue against such active policy

responses, or against the adoption of explicity policy rules that would,
e.g., make monetary growth (or the deviation of act.ual monetary growth
from its expected value) a function of observable contingenci es, a case
must be made for the technical, political or institutiona l impossibili ty
of an active stabilizatio n policy.
The technical impossibilit y of stabilizatio n policy has been argued
on two grounds.

There is the Lucas-Sarge nt-Wallace-B arro argument that

in properly specified macroeconom ic models, only unperceived or unantici
pated monetary policy can affect the deviations of actual real variables
from their "natural" or full information values.

Fiscal policy obviously

has allocative effects both in the short run and in the long run, but it
too cannot systematica lly affect the deviation of real output and employ
ment from their capacity, full employment, or natural levels.

If debt

neutrality prevails, the substitution of lump-sum taxes for current
borrowing has no real effects in the short run or in the long run.

These

policy ineffectiven ess propositions for a while engaged the interest of a
significant part of the macroeconom ics profession but are now generally
viewed as theoretical curiosa without empirical relevance.
The second technical argument against the active use of stabilizatio n
policy is much older (it goes back at least to Milton Friedman's work in
the fifties and sixties) but more relevant.

It is a generalizati on of

the "long and variable lags" argument used by Friedman to make the case
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against active countercyclical use of monetary policy.

Clearly, the

length of the lag between the policy response and its impact on the
variable(s) of interest (the "outside" lag) is irrelevant per se.

It

is uncertainty about the coefficients in the model, about the order of
the lags and indeed about the total specification of the appropriate
model of the economy, that forces one to qualify the confident policy
prescriptives that emerge from the manipulation of models such as th_e
one in this paper.

The length of the "inside lag," the lag between the

identification of the need to respond and the moment the policy handle
can finally be cranked, puts further constraints on our ability to sta
bilize the economy through active demand management.

Estimates.of the

"inside lag" for U.S. fiscal policy range from a few years to infinity.
It should be recognized that uncertainty about the way in which the
economy works not only renders the consequences of policy activism harder
to predict.

It also increases uncertainty about the consequences of

refraining from policy activism and sticking to preannounced, unconditional
(non-contingent or open-loop) rules.

It seems highly unlikely that a

cautious, safety-first ·policy of hedging one's bets in the face of great
uncertainty would ever involve the economic equivalent of locking the
steering wheel and closing one's eyes.
The political or institutional case against active demand management
in part relies on alleged observed asymmetries or irreversibilitie s in
monetary and fiscal policy design.

Policy makers are happy to cut taxes
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and raise spending for cyclical reasons during a slump, but are reluctant
to raise taxes and cut spending when the economy is overheating and a
counter-cyclical quid pro quo is needed.

While there is some informal

evidence supporting this view, there are counter-examples too (e.g., the
increase in the overall British tax burden by 4 percent of GDP during
Prime Minister Thatcher's first term).

It would be very valuable to have

more systematic evidence on this important issue of political economy.
The conditions under which optimal, conditional st~bilization policy
rules would be credible (or time-consistent) also are only just beginning
to be studied.

The study of post-World War II economic history suggests

that "stabilizing" monetary and fiscal policy actions only have their
desired effects if the monetary or fiscal authorities have "conservative"
reputations for underlying monetary soundness and fiscal responsibility
and rectitude.

Without such reputations, temporary and reversible changes

in money growth, tax rates, or spending schedules are likely to be
perceived as permanent.

Such adverse expectations or confidence effects

may lead to inflation premia in nominal interest rates, and even to "super
crowding out" or negative multipliers as a result of increased long real
rates (see Buiter (1985b)).
International stabilization policy coordination through the IMF, as
the world's guardian of sound money and fiscal restraint, could therefore
be especially effective.

There is in any case no alternative agency with

either the prestige or the potential expertise to design a set of workable
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macroeconomic policy rules for the world economic community, to argue for
their adoption with any chance of even partial success and to monitor
compliance and performance.

J:./

The global macroeconomic policy recommendations of the current .!i§2.
can be summarized as:

(1) adherence to unconditional medium-term monetary

growth targets; (2) continued downward pressure on structural fiscal
deficits; and (3) limited counter-cyclical responsiveness of actual
deficits reflecting the par~ial operation of the automatic fiscal stabi
lizers.

Such a policy package will not prevent a global recession if and

when the United States tightens its budgetary stance.

It is not even

sufficient to prevent the slowdown that appears to be underway already.
The risks associated with this strategy are very high.

Even in the

current state of the arts it is not imt)ossible to design a more flexible
and superior set of policy recommendations.

Not for the first (or the

last) time, caution demands if not action, then certainly being prepared
for action should the need arise.

};_/ The human and material resources devoted to the study and manage
ment of the world economy as a whole at the IMF (i.e., to "surveillance
with teeth") are currently very limited, both absolutely and relative to
the resources devoted to individual country stabilization programs.
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